The Ethics of Emergencies

Ayn Rand

In this essay, social thinker and novelist Ayn Rand (1901–1985) argues for ethical egoism—the view that a person's fundamental moral duty is to enhance self-interest—by trying to reveal the flaws of what she terms "the ethics of altruism." Altruistic ethics places primary importance on helping others. Rand says that those who take altruism as an ethical starting point lack self-esteem, fail to respect others, have "a nightmare view of existence," and exhibit a cynical amorality.

Rand argues that it is never rational to sacrifice what you value more for what you value less. She allows that it can be rational, and morally acceptable, to act to benefit others. But that is only because you happen to value them. It is perfectly appropriate to spend money on your beloved children, or a favorite charity. But it isn't rational, and so is not morally required, to devote your time or your money to strangers, or to causes you are indifferent to. To do so would be to sacrifice something you value more (the time or money you could be spending on yourself, or those people or projects you care about) for something you value less.

Rand calls her view Objectivism. It is not to be confused with the meta-ethical doctrine that claims that there are objective moral principles—the meta-ethical doctrine is neutral as to which moral principles are correct, and many who endorse meta-ethical objectivism reject Rand's moral principles. Rand's Objectivism says that the highest moral purpose is the achievement of one's own happiness. If aiding others will not increase one's happiness, then it is not rational to do so. And since, for Rand, there is a close connection between what morality requires and what it is rational to do, it follows that morality does not require us to help others if this involves self-sacrifice on our part.

The psychological results of altruism may be observed in the fact that a great many people approach the subject of ethics by asking such questions as: "Should one risk one's life to help a man who is: a) drowning, b) trapped in a fire, c) stepping in front of a speeding truck, d) hanging by his fingernails over an abyss?"

Consider the implications of that approach. If a man accepts the ethics of altruism, he suffers the following consequences (in proportion to the degree of his acceptance):

(1) Lack of self-esteem—since his first concern in the realm of values is not how to live his life, but how to sacrifice it.
(2) Lack of respect for others—since he regards mankind as a herd of doomed beggars crying for someone's help.
(3) A nightmare view of existence—since he believes that men are trapped in a "malevolent universe" where disasters are the constant and primary concern of their lives.
(4) And, in fact, a lethargic indifference to ethics, a hopelessly cynical amorality—since his questions involve situations which he is not likely ever to encounter, which bear no relation to the actual problems of his own life and thus leave him to live without any moral principles whatever.

By elevating the issue of helping others into the central and primary issue of ethics, altruism has destroyed the concept of any authentic benevolence or good will among men. It has indoctrinated men with the idea that to value another human being is an act of selflessness, thereby implying that a man can have no personal interest in others—that to value another means to sacrifice oneself—that any love, respect or admiration a man may feel for others is not and cannot be a source of his own enjoyment, but is a threat to his existence, a sacrificial blank check signed over to his loved ones.

The men who accept that dichotomy but choose its other side, the ultimate products of altruism's dehumanizing influence, are those psychopaths who do not challenge altruism's basic premise, but proclaim their rebellion.
against self-sacrifice by announcing that they are totally indifferent to anything living and would not lift a finger to help a man or a dog left mangled by a hit-and-run driver (who is usually one of their own kind).

Most men do not accept or practice either side of altruism’s viciously false dichotomy, but its result is a total intellectual chaos on the issue of proper human relationships and on such questions as the nature, purpose or extent of the help one may give to others. Today, a great many well-meaning, reasonable men do not know how to identify or conceptualize the moral principles that motivate their love, affection or good will, and can find no guidance in the field of ethics, which is dominated by the stale platitudes of altruism.

On the question of why men is not a sacrificial animal and why help to others is not his moral duty, I refer you to Atlas Shrugged. This present discussion is concerned with the principles by which one identifies and evaluates the instances involving a man’s nonsacrificial help to others.

“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue. Thus, altruism gauges a man’s virtue by the degree to which he surrenders, renounces or betrays his values (since help to a stranger or an enemy is regarded as more virtuous, less “selfish,” than help to those one loves). The rational principle of conduct is the exact opposite: always act in accordance with the hierarchy of your values, and never sacrifice a greater value to a lesser one.

This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible.

Love and friendship are profoundly personal, selfish values: love is an expression and assertion of self-esteem, a response to one’s own values in the person of another. One gains a profoundly personal, selfish joy from the mere existence of the person one loves. It is one’s own, personal, selfish happiness that one seeks, earns and derives from love.

A “selfless,” “disinterested” love is a contradiction in terms: it means that one is indifferent to that which one values.

Concern for the welfare of those one loves is a rational part of one’s selfish interests. If a man who is passionately in love with his wife spends a fortune to cure her of a dangerous illness, it would be absurd to claim that he does it as a “sacrifice” for her sake, not his own, and that it makes no difference to him, personally and selfishly, whether she lives or dies.

Any action that a man undertakes for the benefit of those he loves is not a sacrifice if, in the hierarchy of his values, the total context of the choices open to him, it achieves that which is of greatest personal (and rational) importance to him. In the above example, his wife’s survival is of greater value to the husband than anything else that his money could buy, it is of greatest importance to his own happiness and, therefore, his action is not a sacrifice.

But suppose he let her die in order to spend his money on saving the lives of ten other women, none of whom meant anything to him—as the ethics of altruism would require. That would be a sacrifice. Here the difference between Objectivism and altruism can be seen most clearly: if sacrifice is the moral principle of action, then that husband should sacrifice his wife for the sake of ten other women. What distinguishes the wife from the ten others? Nothing but her value to the husband who has to make the choice—nothing but the fact that his happiness requires her survival.

The Objectivist ethics would tell him: your highest moral purpose is the achievement of your own happiness, your money is yours, use it to save your wife, that is your moral right and your rational, moral choice.

Consider the soul of the altruistic moralist who would be prepared to tell that husband the opposite. (And then ask yourself whether altruism is motivated by benevolence.)

The proper method of judging whether or not one should help another person is by reference to one’s own rational self-interest and one’s own hierarchy of values: the time, money or effort one gives or the risk one takes should be proportionate to the value of the person in relation to one’s own happiness.

To illustrate this on the altruists’ favorite example: the issue of saving a drowning person. If the person to be saved is a stranger, it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one’s own life is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it: only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one’s life no higher than that of any random stranger. (And, conversely, if one is drowning, one cannot expect a stranger to risk his life for one’s sake, remembering that one’s life cannot be as valuable to him as his own.)

If the person to be saved is not a stranger, then the risk one should be willing to take is greater in proportion to the greatness of that person’s value to oneself. If it is the man or woman one loves, then one can be willing to give one’s own life to save him or her—for the selfish reason that life without the loved person could be unbearable.
Conversely, if a man is able to swim and to save his drowning wife, but becomes panicky, gives in to an unjustified, irrational fear and lets her drown, then spends his life in loneliness and misery—one would not call him "selfish"; one would condemn him morally for his treason to himself and to his own values, that is: his failure to fight for the preservation of a value crucial to his own happiness. Remember that values are that which one acts to gain and/or keep, and that one's own happiness has to be achieved by one's own effort. Since one's own happiness is the moral purpose of one's life, the man who fails to achieve it because of his own default, because of his failure to fight for it, is morally guilty.

The virtue involved in helping those one loves is not "selflessness" or "sacrifice," but integrity. Integrity is loyalty to one's convictions and values; it is the policy of acting in accordance with one's values, of expressing, upholding and translating them into practical reality. If a man professes to love a woman, yet his actions are indifferent, inimical or damaging to her, it is his lack of integrity that makes him immoral.

The same principle applies to relationships among friends. If one's friend is in trouble, one should act to help him by whatever nonsacrificial means are appropriate. For instance, if one's friend is starving, it is not a sacrifice, but an act of integrity to give him money for food rather than buy some insignificant gadget for oneself, because his welfare is important in the scale of one's personal values. If the gadget means more than the friend's suffering, one had no business pretending to be his friend.

The practical implementation of friendship, affection and love consists of incorporating the welfare (the rational welfare) of the person involved into one's own hierarchy of values, then acting accordingly.

But this is a reward which men have to earn by means of their virtues and which one cannot grant to mere acquaintances or strangers.

What, then, should one properly grant to strangers? The generalized respect and good will which one should grant to a human being in the name of the potential value he represents—until and unless he forfeits it.

A rational man does not forget that life is the source of all values and, as such, a common bond among living beings (as against inanimate matter), that other men are potentially able to achieve the same virtues as his own and thus be of enormous value to him. This does not mean that he regards human lives as interchangeable with his own. He recognizes the fact that his own life is the source, not only of all his values, but of his capacity to value. Therefore, the value he grants to others is only a consequence, an extension, a secondary projection of the primary value which is himself.

"The respect and good will that men of self-esteem feel toward other human beings is profoundly egoistic; they feel, in effect: 'Other men are of value because they are of the same species as myself.' In revering living entities, they are revering their own life. This is the psychological base of any emotion of sympathy and any feeling of 'species solidarity.'"

Since men are born tabula rasa, both cognitively and morally, a rational man regards strangers as innocent until proved guilty, and grants them that initial good will in the name of their human potential. After that, he judges them according to the moral character they have actualized. If he finds them guilty of major evils, his good will is replaced by contempt and moral condemnation. (If one values human life, one cannot value its destroyers.) If he finds them to be virtuous, he grants them personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues.

It is on the ground of that generalized good will and respect for the value of human life that one helps strangers in an emergency—and only in an emergency.

It is important to differentiate between the rules of conduct in an emergency situation and the rules of conduct in the normal conditions of human existence. This does not mean a double standard of morality: the standard and the basic principles remain the same, but their application to either case requires precise definitions.

An emergency is an unchosen, unexpected event, limited in time, that creates conditions under which human survival is impossible—such as a flood, an earthquake, a fire, a shipwreck. In an emergency situation, men's primary goal is to combat the disaster, escape the danger and restore normal conditions (to reach dry land, to put out the fire, etc.).

By "normal" conditions I mean metaphysically normal, normal in the nature of things, and appropriate to human existence. Men can live on land, but not in water or in a raging fire. Since men are not omnipotent, it is metaphysically possible for unforeseeable disasters to strike them, in which case their only task is to return to those conditions under which their lives can continue. By its nature, an emergency situation is temporary; if it were to last, men would perish.

It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it is in one's power. For instance, a man who values human life

and is caught in a shipwreck, should help to save his fellow passengers
(though not at the expense of his own life). But this does not mean that
after they all reach shore, he should devote his efforts to saving his fellow
passengers from poverty, ignorance, neurosis or whatever other troubles
they might have. Nor does it mean that he should spend his life sailing the
seven seas in search of shipwreck victims to save.

Or to take an example that can occur in everyday life: suppose one
hears that the man next door is ill and penniless. Illness and poverty
are not metaphysical emergencies, they are part of the normal risks of exis-
tence; but since the man is temporarily helpless, one may bring him food
and medicine, if one can afford it (as an act of goodwill, not of duty) or one
may raise a fund among the neighbors to help him out. But this does not
mean that one must support him from then on, nor that one must spend
one's life looking for starving men to help.

In the normal conditions of existence, man has to choose his goals, pro-
ject them in time, pursue them and achieve them by his own effort. He cannot
do it if his goals are at the mercy of and must be sacrificed to any misfortune
happening to others. He cannot live his life by the guidance of rules applicable
only to conditions under which human survival is impossible.

The principle that one should help men in an emergency cannot be
extended to regard all human suffering as an emergency and to turn the
misfortune of some into a first mortgage on the lives of others.

Poverty, ignorance, illness and other problems of that kind are not
metaphysical emergencies. By the metaphysical nature of man and of exis-
tence, man has to maintain his life by his own effort; the values he needs—
such as wealth or knowledge—are not given to him automatically, as a gift
of nature, but have to be discovered and achieved by his own thinking
and work. One's sole obligation toward others, in this respect, is to main-
tain a social system that leaves men free to achieve, to gain and to keep
their values.

Every code of ethics is based on and derived from a metaphysics, that
is: from a theory about the fundamental nature of the universe in which
man lives and acts. The altruist ethics is based on a "malevolent universe"
metaphysics, on the theory that man, by his very nature, is helpless and
doomed—that success, happiness, achievement are impossible to him—
that emergencies, disasters, catastrophes are the norm of his life and that
his primary goal is to combat them.

As the simplest empirical refutation of that metaphysics—as evi-
dence of the fact that the material universe is not inimical to man and that
catastrophes are the exception, not the rule of his existence—observe the
fortunes made by insurance companies.

Observe also that the advocates of altruism are unable to base their
ethics on any facts of men's normal existence and that they always offer
"lifeboat" situations as examples from which to derive the rules of moral
conduct. ("What should you do if you and another man are in a lifeboat
that can carry only one?" etc.)

The fact is that men do not live in lifeboats—and that a lifeboat is not
the place on which to base one's metaphysics.

The moral purpose of man's life is the achievement of his own happiness.
This does not mean that he is indifferent to all men, that human life is of no
value to him and that he has no reason to help others in an emergency. But it
does mean that he does not subordinate his life to the welfare of others, that he
does not sacrifice himself to their needs, that the relief of their suffering is not
his primary concern, that any help he gives is an exception, not a rule, an act of
generosity, not of moral duty, that it is marginal and incidental—as disasters
are marginal and incidental in the course of human existence—and that values,
not disasters, are the goal, the first concern and the motive power of his life.

Ayn Rand: The Ethics of Emergencies

1. Rand contrasts her view with what she calls "the ethics of altruism."

   What is the ethics of altruism, and why does Rand object to it? Do you
   find her reasons compelling?

2. Rand claims that love and friendship are "selfish values." What does she
   mean by this, and how does she argue for it? Do you agree with her?

3. According to Rand, the fundamental principle of morality is "always act
   in accordance with the hierarchy of your values." Does it follow from
   this that one ought to lie, steal, and murder if these actions would allow
   one to accomplish what one values most? Why or why not?

4. Rand asserts that the ethics of altruism is based on a false theory about
   the fundamental nature of the universe. What is this theory, and why
does Rand think that altruists believe in it?

5. What is "sacrifice" according to Rand? Do you agree with her that sac-
rifice is always irrational?